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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E OF U T A H 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
\ 
vs. 
S T E W A R T M I C H A E L K E L S E Y 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13376 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
P O I N T I. T H I S COURT CANNOT R E -
V I E W M A T T E R S NOT O F RECORD. 
In an attempt to rebut Appellant's argument that 
the Court erred in accepting Appellant's waiver of the 
jury, the Attorney General recites a ruling made by 
Judge Baldwin in the pending case of State v. Chris-
tean $ Rogers, and then states that that ruling, made 
in a different forum by a different judge and before 
different counsel and accused, becomes the "law of 
this case". 
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Respondent speculates. Nothing in the record 
shows that Judge Wilkins and counsel were even cog-
nizant of a ruling made in another case or that such a 
ruling was made, much less that Judge Wilkins "re-
lied" upon such a ruling. How the "findings of law" 
made by Judge Baldwin became the "law of the case" 
in a trial presided over by Judge Wilkins is a mystery. 
Can Judge Baldwin make a ruling to bind Judge 
Wilkins? 
With all due respect to the Attorney General and 
his venerable staff such is not the law in this state nor 
in any of these United States. 
The case of Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 123, 252 
P . 677 (1929) which Respondent cites to support his 
suppositions is hardly in point. There the record showed 
that the court had made a ruling and that it was ac-
quiesed in by all parties. Here there was no such ruling. 
Respondent would have us believe that it was 
"understood" by the court and counsel that the death 
penalty would not be imposed. The record is silent as 
to whether such a ruling was even considered. I t is 
such fundamental law that an appellate court cannot 
go beyond or behind the record, and speculate upon 
what was in the mind of court or counsel, or what in-
fluences from what other courtrooms they were subject 
to, that it hardly needs to be reiterated here. This 
court must consider only the record. Cooper v. For-
esters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257P2 540 
(1953) Trails Motors, Inc., v. First National Bank of 
Laramie, 76 Wyo. 152, 301 P2 775. 
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The record does not show that Judge Wilkins ruled 
that the death penalty would not be imposed. Res-
pondent concedes as much. A non-existing ruling can-
not become "the law of the case." The imposition of 
the death penalty was very much a possibility, and a 
reality as far as Kelsey is concerned. 
Appellant agrees with the Attorney General as 
he states on page 8 and 9 of his brief, "Therefore, in 
capital cases where a death penalty may be a reality, 
one must be tried by a jury of twelve." 
P O I N T I I . T H E U T A H C O N S T I T U T I O N 
A N D S T A T U T E S CANNOT B E D I S R E -
G A R D E D AS R E S P O N D E N T CONTENDS. 
By §77-27-2 the legislature of the State of Utah 
limits a defendant's right to waive a jury. The statute 
clearly states that his right to a jury may be waived 
only when he is charged with a non-capital offense. 
Respondent contends that this court need not pay any 
attention to the Utah Constitutional and The Statu-
tory Law of Utah, and argues that every defendant 
"ought" to be allowed to waive every right he has. 
This court cannot and never has considered what 
the law "ought" to be, that being a function of the 
legislature, but only what the law is, as set forth in our 
constitution and statutes. To do otherwise tears the 
fabric of our constitutional government and mixes the 
powers intended to be carefully separated. 
Respondent states that nothing in the Utah con-
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stitution provides that the right to a jury trial can 
never be waived but entreats the court to ignore the 
fact that the legislature has clearly so provided by 
§77-27-2 UCA 1953. The legislature has not merely 
"attempted" to restrict waivers, as contended by Res-
pondent but has actually done so. This court can only 
"ignore" or strike down a statute if it finds the statute 
to be unconstitutional. We do not have a constitutional 
right to waive our rights, and the statutory resriction 
on such waiver cannot be ignored. 
Respondent relies heavily upon the language of 
Patton v. U.S. 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 
854 (1930). However, in that case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court merely found that nothing in the U.S. Constitu-
tion prevented a defendant from knowingly and in-
telligently waiving his right to a jury. The court was 
not required to interpret a statute as clear as ours 
which restricts waiver in capital cases. 
None of the authorities cited by Respondent are 
in point since in none of his cases other than People v. 
Duchin 12 N.Y.2 351, 190 NE2 17 (1963) interpret 
a statute which restricts waivers. 
Appellant concedes that the New York constitu-
tion as quoted by Respondent closely resembles our 
constitution and statute together. But Respondent at-
tempts to throw sand in the eyes of the court when he 
states that the Duchin stands for the principle that 
waiver of a jury must be allowed in all cases in spite 
of the plain language restricting waiver in capital cases. 
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None of the crimes Duchin was charged with were 
capital crimes under New York law. He had requested 
a waiver of the jury, but the court denied the request. 
A jury tried the case and Duchin was convicted The 
New York court found that Duchin had made a know-
ing and intelligent waiver which was valid under New 
York's constitution, allowing such waivers in non-Cap-
ital cases, reversed and remanded the case to be tried 
without a jury, since that was the Defendant's choice. 
The facts in Duchin are entirely different from 
those of the instant case. Kelsey was tried for first 
degree murder. First degree murder is a capital case 
in Utah. The legislature has provided that no waiver 
of a jury is allowable in a capital case in Utah. No 
matter how Respondent squirms, those are the facts in 
this case. The trial court erred when it accepted a 
waiver of jury in a capital case and the judgment 
should be reversed. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S AC-
CEPTANCE OF WAIVER OF THE JURY 
DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
Respondent contends that Appellant cannot assign 
as reversible error, error which he has induced the court 
to make. Ordinarily, that contention would be true, 
but this is a capital case and this court has stated that 
in capital cases not only will it consider errors induced 
by the defendant, but it will raise such questions on 
its own motion, even if error is not assigned by de-
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fendant. See State v. Matteri, 119 Utah 143, 225 P2 
325 (1950), where the court, after noting that the in-
struction in question was contained in substance in De-
fendant's requested jury instructions, states, p. 330: 
"Despite this fact, however, this a capital case, 
we should take cognizance of any palpable error 
in the record which might have prejudiced the 
defendant though not assigned, or even if in-
vited by the defendant himself/' 
None of the cases cited by Respondent in support 
of his Point I I , concerned capital crimes, and so are 
not in point. 
Further, the court, in accepting Appellant's waiver 
deprived itself of its own jurisdiction. Low v. U.S., 169 
F . 86 (6th Cir. 1909). 
The judgment is void, since the court had no juris-
diction, and Appellant is currently incarcerated as a 
result of a void judgment. 
I t is difficult to imagine an error more prejudicial 
to a defendant's rights than depriving him of his right 
to a jury trial. The Utah constitution provides that 
the right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate, §77-27-2, 
UCA 1953 provides that such a jury cannot be waived 
in a capital case. The process of law requires this de-
fendant to be tried by a jury of twelve and he was de-
prived of that due process when he was tried without 
a jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons and those in Appellant's 
main brief, Appellant submits that substantial preju-
dicial error was made in the trial and respectfully sub-
mits that his case should be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial, consistent with the holdings of this 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E L A I N E D. L A R S E N 
455 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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